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ABSTRACT
AN EDUCATIONAL OPERATING SYSTEM
SUPPORTING COMPUTER SECURITY
Patrick J. McGee
Marquette University
It is uncommon to teach computer security concepts using an embedded operating
system. Few educational operating systems are implemented in systems courses, and a
small subset of them are used to teach hardware-related security elements such as system
calls. This work explores relevant approaches to teaching low-level security concepts,
including difficulties associated with building a hands-on learning environment.
This work also presents additions to the Embedded Xinu kernel that support system
calls and memory protection on a Raspberry Pi 3 B+. Provided sample assignments
are intended to help give students a solid understanding of intricate hardware details.
Results from an assignment run in a computer security course show that the system call
interface provides an effective way to teach essential computer security measures.
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1CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.0.1 Thesis Statement
An embedded, educational operating system can effectively facilitate the teach-
ing of computer security concepts at the collegiate level.
1.0.2 Overview
To teach courses such as operating systems and computer security, it is common
for instructors to gravitate toward approaches that offer students limited practical in-
volvement, if any at all. This is because it is seen as too difficult for students to learn
such concepts in a hands-on manner, or that available resources for hands-on teaching
are unfamiliar to the instructor. Many courses employ a theoretical approach in which
students spend time solving problems that are only indirectly related to programming
physical systems. Other common approaches include examinations of full-size, produc-
tion operating systems. While students may be subject to writing or modifying code in
these cases, the unnecessary overhead – inherited from the size of the operating system
– limits the students’ scope to a single component or sub-component. This is unde-
sirable since it is ineffective in displaying the interactions between operating system
components, and cannot reasonably present hardware-informed design decisions to a
student.
A proven alternative is the use of educational operating systems – software cre-
ated specifically for students to observe and develop components of an operating sys-
tem. Embedded Xinu is an educational operating system that is publicly available and
maintained by researchers at Marquette University’s Systems Laboratory. Xinu is pro-
grammed to run on real, inexpensive hardware such as a Linksys router or a Raspberry
Pi computer. Therefore, universities can create affordable laboratory environment con-
figurations to ease the load; a group of students need not share a single machine to
execute their kernel.
2This work presents security-oriented contributions to the Embedded Xinu oper-
ating system. These additions cover two low-level components:
• System calls, an interface for unprivileged tasks to access privileged operating
system services, and
• Memory protection, a configuration that invokes built-in hardware safeguards to
shield computer storage from invalid accesses.
This work includes a study of student performance on a system call assignment
run in a computer security course at Marquette University (COSC 5360). Also included
is a sample assignment for the memory protection facility, and a more complex version
of the system call assignment. This work focuses on implementing software that is
as concisely-written as possible, enabling students to be less intimidated when reading
source files.
The arrangement of this thesis is as follows:
• Chapter 1 introduces this work and explains its contributions,
• Chapter 2 explains foundational terms upon which this thesis will expand,
• Chapter 3 presents a literature review of tools for systems education and relevant
design principles,
• Chapter 4 details the implementation of system calls on this platform, including
a sample assignment,
• Chapter 5 describes the established memory security structure, including a sample
assignment,
• Chapter 6 details the system call assignment run in a cross-listed computer security
course,
• Chapter 7 presents an analysis of student performance on the system call assign-
ment, discussing the results, and
3• Chapter 8 summarizes this work and describes directions of potential future work.
1.0.3 Contributions
This thesis presents additions to the Embedded Xinu operating system that fa-
cilitate hands-on learning of fundamental topics in computer security. Also discussed are
the difficulties encountered while implementing new functionality in the kernel. Teach-
ing difficulties and outcomes are discussed, regarding a system call assignment run in
a computer security course. The final student performance evaluation shows that it is
achievable to teach such concepts to students of various computing disciplines – even
those who have never had experience programming an embedded system.
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Background
2.0.1 Embedded Xinu
The Embedded Xinu operating system (O/S) descends from Xinu, an educa-
tional O/S created in the 1980s by Douglas Comer [10]. Many books about the parent
kernel were written by Comer [12], who also maintains a webpage listing the various
applications of Xinu both in industry and in systems education [13]. Xinu was origi-
nally supported to run on CISC (complex instruction set computer) architectures, such
as Intel’s x86 platform, that are equipped with instruction sets containing hundreds of
operations [14]. A student learning assembly language for a CISC machine only needs
to understand a small subset of the available instructions. Xinu mitigated this overhead
when it was ported to modern RISC (reduced instruction set computer) platforms, such
as the Linksys wireless router [9] and the Raspberry Pi 1 [8]. These ports established
Embedded Xinu and distinguished it from its CISC-supporting counterpart.
2.0.2 Development and Deployment
One of the central goals of Embedded Xinu is to expose students to real hardware.
Marquette University researchers have been porting the O/S to new platforms, such as
the parallel-oriented Intel Single-Chip Cloud (SCC) computer [42]. The most recent
port of Embedded Xinu to the Raspberry Pi 3 B+ [6] allows hardware systems [19] and
operating systems courses to provide hands-on experimentation in a multicore execution
environment. Earlier ports of Embedded Xinu have been used to teach compilers [22]
and embedded systems [32]. Until this work, Embedded Xinu was unsuited to teach
hardware security since no explicit security facilities had been implemented.
2.0.3 Computer Security
Modern computing standards demand secure operations. The broad range of
security topics includes information security, cryptography, and network transmission.
5This thesis focuses on the hardware aspect of computer security, i.e., the security facil-
ities that computer hardware provides to the software that is running on it.
2.0.4 Execution Modes
The hardware component of a computer that executes a program’s instructions is
the central processing unit. After a computer program is compiled, it runs by invoking
the CPU, which processes it one instruction at a time. An operating system is an
example of a computer program. The O/S offers abstractions called threads that are
units of execution that perform a specific task [34]. Modern O/Ses provide multitasking,
a feature that enables the illusion that many threads are running at the same time. In
actuality, they are constantly being switched, sharing a single CPU’s resources. This
procedure is commonly referred to as a “task switch” or “context switch” [35].
A CPU executes in a particular mode, which determines how its instructions
will be executed. Processors have a set of execution modes which the O/S designer
can implement. A privileged mode called System mode has unrestricted access to the
processor’s instruction set. While simple in design, an O/S that performs all of its tasks
in System mode – including running user threads – is susceptible to security instability.
For instance, a user of such an operating system can run an instruction that modifies a
memory space in use by the kernel. This type of modification – whether it was caused by
a malicious actor or a system error – would likely cause the system to fault irrecoverably.
Instead of running all tasks in System mode, a more desirable approach is to
make use of a processor’s unprivileged User mode. User mode implies that the exe-
cution environment is restricted. At the most basic level, a processor running in User
mode is unable to execute privileged instructions that may interfere with the underlying
operating system. A more advanced computer might also support a memory system
that can determine – based on the current execution mode – whether a memory access
is valid. Invalid accesses cause a fault, and the O/S designer can choose how to deal
with it.
62.0.5 System Calls
How does one design an operating system that is both (a) capable of overseeing
privileged execution and (b) able to operate user threads securely? System calls, or
Supervisor calls (SVC) provide this feature. A Supervisor call is an interface for unpriv-
ileged threads to temporarily access privileged O/S resources. While System mode is all
powerful, and User mode is limited, Supervisor calls execute in a privileged environment
called Supervisor mode. Generally, this mode has the same high privilege as System
mode. Supervisor calls are based on instruction set access. Some instructions, such as
those that modify CPU registers, are only accessible from a privileged mode. In many
cases, instructions can be allowed by the CPU but restricted by the operating system.
In this case, it is up to the O/S designer to decide which operations should require
Supervisor privilege. A simple O/S, such as an educational one, may only include a few
applications of Supervisor calls in its kernel. A production O/S offers more protection,
but with high complexity.
2.0.6 Compilation
Just like any computer program, an operating system must be translated to
a language that the machine can understand before it can run. This is the job of a
compiler. The Embedded Xinu O/S relies on the GNU cross-compiler (GCC) to convert
the kernel source code, written mostly in C, to a series of object files. These productions
are then linked together to create the final executable O/S image that can be transferred
to and run on a supported machine.
The process of transferring a program, such as a kernel, into the main memory
of a machine is called loading. The loader is just another program that can be designed
to support the specific initial interaction that the CPU expects. For example, a CPU
platform (or architecture) may require the first instruction to be loaded into its main
memory at a specific address. If this address is not included in the loader script, the
CPU will not begin execution.
7Compilers such as GCC have a set of optimization options available. Common
benefits of optimizing a program include: smaller code size, faster program execution,
and fewer branches taken (i.e., perform an instruction reorder such that instead of
jumping to an instruction far away in memory, continue executing it in the current
space). The compiler is trusted to perform optimizations without changing the meaning
of the program, but in some specific cases, optimization can cause undesirable effects,
such as modification of local variables.
2.0.7 Tools
This work was completed using the latest port of Embedded Xinu, running on
a Raspberry Pi 3 B+. The Marquette University Systems Laboratory (“Systems Lab”)
provides the environment necessary to remotely execute a kernel on a Raspberry Pi,
supporting input and output. This arrangement is explained in Section 6.0.2.
2.0.8 Summary of Background
Embedded Xinu is a public, educational operating system that has offered practi-
cal experience to students across systems courses. System calls allow the O/S to manage
and secure its resources while providing an interface for user programs to request specific
privileged services.
8CHAPTER 3
Related Work
Many small operating systems have been applied in education. Recent papers
describe uses of educational operating systems at universities. Although few existing
papers describe an educational O/S that supports a hardware-focused security curricu-
lum, some publications have described practices in teaching security concepts that are
close to the hardware. This chapter discusses the most recent literature relevant to
educational operating systems, and offers context about design decisions that shadow
interaction between the hardware and the operating system.
3.0.1 Educational Operating Systems
While Marquette University teaches systems courses using Embedded Xinu on
real hardware, both physical and virtual platforms make for effective teaching tools.
However, when it comes to examinations of hardware-level interactions, virtual platforms
inherently fall short. This section compares Embedded Xinu with existing educational
operating systems and examines various approaches in design.
3.0.2 Physical Hardware Ports
The use of an educational operating system is an uncommon approach to teach
systems concepts, but several existing educational O/Ses share design decisions with
Embedded Xinu. Perhaps the most similar O/S is vmwOS, developed by researchers at
the University of Maine to teach a graduate-level operating systems course [16]. Like
Xinu, vmwOS is written in C, but it runs on the Raspberry Pi 3 Model B, the predecessor
of the Pi 3 B+. Both platforms support the same ARM Cortex A-53 architecture.
However, vmwOS supports 64-bit mode, while Xinu runs in ARMv7 32-bit mode for
the sake of simplicity. In addition, vmwOS activates the Memory Management Unit
(MMU), but employs an ”honor system” that does not actually protect a user thread’s
9interaction with the kernel. Chapter 5 of this thesis presents an effective mechanism to
prevent a user thread from modifying kernel space.
Another similar O/S is Minix, developed by Andrew S. Tanenbaum at VU Am-
sterdam [36]. Like the original Xinu operating system, several O/S books have been
written, incorporating Minix source code [37]. Like Embedded Xinu, Minix has been
ported to the Raspberry Pi and the Intel SCC [20]. Minix is a microkernel; it a small
O/S with industry-standard features that have even been used to support platforms such
as x86 [40]. Minix’s teaching applications are well-documented, and plenty of academic
projects have spawned from Minix [41].
3.0.3 Simulated Ports
Embedded Xinu is designed to expose computing students to a real operating
system running on real hardware, as opposed to a simulation on a virtual machine.
However, there are many cases in which building a full-scale, physical laboratory envi-
ronment might not be feasible. An instructor may not have the resources required to
expand their current teaching approach and attempt to build a physical system robust
enough to handle a full class. Such a laboratory environment usually requires mainte-
nance from a group of dedicated researchers and teaching assistants that may not be
immediately available in many CS departments. To cater to this need, some educa-
tional O/Ses are strictly built to run on simulators. One such O/S is Nachos, which
runs on a MIPS architecture simulator [11]. Moving away from RISC O/Ses, other
simulator-supported, educational O/Ses are x86-based gemOS [25] and Pintos [7].
Moving into higher levels of abstraction in teaching operating systems, researchers
at the University of Nevada in Reno propose an alternative strategy in which O/S op-
erations are simulated by formatted textual statements rather than an architecture
simulator [24]. Such a simulation can be a sufficient programming environment to teach
operating systems, but under this model, students are spending time experimenting with
a language-defined O/S in place of experimenting with real operating system compo-
nents.
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A similar high-level approach is from Calvin College’s CaIOS, an educational
operating system simulator written entirely in Python [27]. This tool may be especially
useful in an environment where students are unfamiliar with writing programs in as-
sembly language or C. CaIOS is designed such that each O/S component is contained
in a Python class, which could make it easier for students who don’t know C. However,
students might become confused since classes imply potential inheritance, which does
not apply for many components that it simulates. For example, creating a new instance
of a thread class is a somewhat accurate simulation of an important operating system
task, but CaIOS also defines classes that simulate hardware components such as the
CPU, which complicates the boundary between hardware and software.
3.0.4 Security Education
Educational O/Ses are capable of teaching essential computing concepts, but
only a few include principles of system security. This section details recent work aimed
at bringing security concepts to a systems course.
3.0.5 MiniOS
In 2015, researchers from the University of Northern British Columbia chose a
course model in which students build their kernel (named MiniOS) from scratch, instead
of modifying an existing educational O/S to fit their standards for the course [31]. The
O/S course at Marquette University also follows this approach; through a series of cumu-
lative C and ARM assembly assignments, students write essential components and end
up with a functional kernel. MiniOS runs on an ARM-based, Atmel SAM4S Xplained
Pro prototyping board customized to include components that exist on a Raspberry Pi
(i.e., NAND flash memory, GPIO header, and an on-board UART). Using a prototyping
board inherently ties the development environment to proprietary development tools;
MiniOS students can build and run their O/S projects from Microchip’s Atmel Studio
6 – a suite related to Microsoft Visual Studio [5] – while Embedded Xinu is built and
executed from a Unix command-line.
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An operating system’s hardware platform determines the span of programmable
features. Choosing to design an embedded system (e.g., using a development board as
the base and attaching shields) may ease the depth of programming required to run an
operating system because extensional components offer an easily-tailored development
experience. In contrast, a Raspberry Pi-like computer has immutable features that O/S
designers must learn and program accordingly. As this thesis will cover, it is difficult
to program a poorly-documented System-on-Chip (SoC). But while prototyping boards
eliminate hurdles such as writing unfamiliar device drivers, their associated development
environment may abstract away key O/S components such as the bootloader. Embedded
Xinu’s bootloader is visible to students in a single assembly file, and it makes for a
good demonstration when introducing bootloaders in hardware systems and operating
systems.
MiniOS’s chosen hardware platform favors kernel simplicity. Their board fea-
tures program memory, a corresponding memory protection unit (MPU), and a boot-
loader. As one of its first major projects, the MiniOS course introduces User mode and
software interrupts (analogous to this work’s Supervisor calls). To simplify this part of
the project, the authors of MiniOS give the students the instructions necessary to change
modes – a teaching philosophy shared with this thesis. Beginning ARM programmers
should not be expected to figure out the instructions and setup required to support
Supervisor mode, for instance. The subsequent MiniOS project requires students to
protect kernel data via the on-board MPU. Because the MPU is already included and
configured, students are unable to directly interact with the hardware.
3.0.6 Summary of Related Work
It is a rarity to use an educational operating system to teach security concepts.
For operating systems that run on virtual machines, the scope of projects or laboratory
experiments is limited to software-level interaction. Existing educational O/Ses that run
on an embedded platform enable hardware visibility, but depending on the platform’s
design, some hardware details (such as those that provide security) may be hidden from
the kernel.
12
CHAPTER 4
Supervisor Calls
This chapter describes the implementation of SVC calls in Embedded Xinu for
the ARM-based Raspberry Pi 3 B+. Education-oriented design goals are discussed, as
well as development difficulties. The final section of this chapter introduces a sample
assignment and considers how it can be modified to better support a given group of
students.
4.0.1 Hardware Considerations
When choosing an embedded platform for an educational operating system, it
is important to consider the associated goals of the system as a teaching tool. For the
O/S to be most effective, the platform’s hardware should align with these goals. One
such goal may be laboratory integration. With respect to this goal, some desired O/S
functionality may even be included as a hardware unit, as is the case with the networking
hardware of the Raspberry Pi 3 B+ that allows the loaded operating system to boot
over the network [29]. In developing a lightweight O/S for such a platform, the network
driver – which occupies approximately 1700 lines of code in the Xinu kernel [23][15] –
need not be written to achieve basic usability. If the network driver is not to be used in
application, then the desired goal of laboratory integration can be achieved by choosing
a platform that supports network booting.
Another example of a logistical system goal is scalability. The amount of indi-
vidual machines in a laboratory should fit the needs of the courses they are supporting.
Thus, cost is an important factor. Table 4.0.1 weighs essential attributes of platforms
that have been used to support educational operating systems.
To teach security concepts in a hands-on course, any of these platforms are quali-
fied. Cost considerations are especially important; a laboratory environment supporting
educational O/Ses should be functional, but affordable. Purdue University runs the
13
Platform Class Processor Arch. Memory Price
Atmel SAM4S Dev. ARM 32 (2MB) $48
Raspberry Pi 3 B+ PC ARM A-53 32/64 1GB $35
Beaglebone Black Rev C PC ARM A-8 32 512MB $60
Linksys WRT54GL Router PC MIPS 32 16MB $50
QEMU Emu. – – – $0
Intel Galileo Dev. x86 32 (256MB) $70
Table 4.1: Comparison of common educational O/S platforms
Xinu operating system on the Beaglebone Black [13], a more feature-packed (and more
costly) competitor of the Raspberry Pi. This presents a trade-off: while the feature-
packed Beaglebone board may provide active, long-term development of the O/S to be
implemented, a less costly alternative is more justifiable for a laboratory setting. At 35
USD, the Pi 3 B+ is a cost-effective solution.
Organizational needs (such as scalability in a laboratory environment) will nar-
row down the contenders. However, in making a final decision on the platform, course
material should ultimately determine the required hardware. For example, for a course
that covers hardware-level memory protection, it is desirable to choose a platform that
(1) has a memory management unit and (2) does not provide abstractions that will
hide the interaction between the memory management unit and corresponding software
requests. Similarly, if the course includes mode-based protection, instructions should
be available on the platform that allow a temporary mode switch to take place, such as
svc (Supervisor call) or swi (software interrupt).
Another important factor is available documentation, adding complexity to the
decision. During the latest port of Embedded Xinu to the Pi 3 B+, lack of documentation
for its SoC yielded major development challenges. However, since the release of the Pi
3 B+ in 2017, active online communities such as the Pi Bare Metal Forums [28] have
provided direct communication between ARM developers and Pi engineers. Especially
in initial design stages of an operating system, this official communication medium has
saved the Embedded Xinu Team many hours of programming frustration. On the other
hand, the Beaglebone boards are extremely well-documented, with an entire Technical
Reference Manual available on their GitHub [18].
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The Raspberry Pi has proven to be a canonical teaching tool, from introductory
computer courses to advanced systems courses. The Pi Foundation has a site dedicated
to providing resources to instructors, including instructions to set up a basic laboratory
environment [30]. The creators of the board are also involved in education; a recent
textbook written by the Raspberry Pi co-creator focuses on teaching computer archi-
tecture with the Raspberry Pi 3 Model B, and includes a detailed chapter written by
an engineer of its graphics processing unit [39].
4.0.2 Processor Modes
This research evolved from the idea that students should experiment with protec-
tion facilities that the hardware provides, such as mode-based protection. A processor’s
execution mode defines its current state – that is, the method it will use to execute
instructions such as svc. The Pi 3 B+’s CPU has seven execution modes:
• System mode,
• User mode.
• Supervisor mode,
• Abort mode,
• Fast Interrupt Request (FIQ) mode,
• Interrupt Request (IRQ) mode, and
• Undefined mode.
Before this work, Embedded Xinu only executed in System mode, IRQ mode,
or FIQ mode. System mode is a privileged mode; all instructions are valid in this
mode. Using System mode for all basic execution provides an elegant design, but the
built-in hardware security facilities go unused. When the processor executes in User
mode, privileged instructions become undefined. Because the SoC of the Pi 3 B+ has no
publicly available documentation, it is difficult to determine exactly which instructions
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are considered privileged, and which are available in User mode. Supervisor mode, like
System mode, is a privileged mode. However, Supervisor mode is an exception mode,
and System mode is not. Hence, to enter Supervisor mode (or any exception mode), the
processor generates an exception that is caught by Xinu’s exception handler.
Supervisor mode has its own banked stack pointer (a register that keeps track of
the runtime stack) and link register (a register that holds the address of the instruction
to return to when the currently executing function completes) [1]. Per the ARM calling
convention, registers r0-r3 are pushed onto the stack at the time of a function call [3].
When handling a Supervisor mode exception, it is beneficial to use its respective stack
to save these arguments. Therefore, its stack is initialized in the bootloader. Figure 4.1
shows an updated Embedded Xinu memory diagram.
Figure 4.1: Embedded Xinu memory diagram
After the Raspberry Pi powers on, the kernel’s bootloader performs initialization
steps such as preparing the stack memory for each potential execution mode. When
handling an exception such as Supervisor, the platform requires the corresponding stack
to be 8-byte aligned, per the ARM procedure call standard [2]. After beginning to
execute a function that was branched to by the exception handler, such as a handler
routine, the mode switch implies that the stack pointer has been updated. Therefore,
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since the handler routine can no longer guarantee alignment of the stack, it is realigned
on the proper boundary.
While the Pi 3 B+ is equipped with a four-core processor, this implementation
leaves three of the cores disabled. Expanding the kernel becomes a simpler task when
there are no issues of multicore concurrency presented. This benefits the developer
because unexplored behaviors – regarding system calls across cores – are eliminated.
This decision also aligns with Xinu’s use as a teaching tool. The student need not be
overwhelmed by a multicore system introduced alongside already-new hardware details.
Figure 4.2: Xinu’s initialization sequence with system calls enabled
After Embedded Xinu loads the null thread, the processor is still in System mode
(see Figure 4.2). Some of the most critical initialization steps follow. To execute the
kernel after it is transferred over the network, the Ethernet device must first be initial-
ized. (Of course, network bootable hardware is available on this platform, but because
Xinu’s kexec() [8] function cuts the default boot time in half, the Ethernet driver is
initialized). As Section 4.0.6 will explain, interrupts are disabled in User mode. As a
quirk of the platform, network communication goes through the USB device. Therefore,
the USB subsystem must first be enabled. USB transfers require interrupts to be en-
abled, so this entire process takes place in System mode. To maintain simplicity, User
mode is entered as late as possible – before the main thread begins executing.
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4.0.3 SVC Handler
A Supervisor call (SVC) interface, or system call interface, is an abstraction
that allows the processor, running in an unprivileged mode, to safely execute privileged
instructions and return to normal execution. Figure 4.3 shows the sequence of a system
call for getcpuid(), a function that returns the numeric identifier of the current
processor core.
Figure 4.3: Sequence diagram for the getcpuid() system call
Before jumping into the SVC handler mechanism, it is necessary to understand
how the ARM Cortex A-53 processor operates when switching modes. The Current
Program Status Register (CPSR) holds information about the current mode, including
execution state and interrupt masks indicating whether the current execution can be
interrupted by a running task. The CPSR is accessible in all processor modes. The
Saved Program Status Register (SPSR) is only accessible from exception modes such as
Supervisor mode. This extra register preserves information about the interrupted mode.
The svc instruction is part of both the 32-bit ARM state instruction set, as well
as the 16-bit Thumb instruction set. This detail is important when handling the SVC
because exceptions generated during Thumb state switch to ARM execution before en-
tering the handler [1]. Further, the processor assumes an ARM execution state and sets
the SVC link register (lr svc) to address of svc + 2, adding a halfword. When an
svc instruction is executed, the immediate value in its single operand is used to identify
the specific service requested. Therefore, to understand the service, it is necessary to
be able to extract the immediate value – known as the SVC number – that is sitting in
18
the svc instruction. To differentiate the kernel services provided, each SVC number is
uniquely defined in a header file, include/svc.h.
mrs r0 , sp s r // Save SPSR
t s t r0 , #0x20 // I f Thumb b i t i s 1
ldrneh r0 , [ l r ,#−2] // then load the hal fword
bicne r0 , r0 , #0xFF00 // ex t r a c t 8−b i t immediate
ld r eq r0 , [ l r ,#−4] // Else , load word
b iceq r0 , r0 , #0xFF000000 // ex t r a c t 24−b i t immediate
// r0 ho lds SVCNUMBER
Figure 4.4: SVC number extraction
Depending on the state (ARM or Thumb) that the processor was executing in
at the time of the instruction, the instruction format will vary, changing the method of
accessing the SVC number from the instruction. A series of operations [4] are required
to extract the SVC number from this location (see Figure 4.4). After the SVC number
is extracted from the instruction, the dispatch call is staged. The SVC dispatcher,
written in C, is responsible for both staging and calling the requested service. It takes
two arguments: the extracted SVC number and the stack pointer of Supervisor mode.
Because the SVC number uniquely identifies a kernel function, a switch statement on
the SVC number provides a straightforward convention to stage a call.
To differentiate a User mode API from a kernel function, this implementation
enforces a naming convention. User function names descend from “normal” function
names and are retained. Kernel functions use the prefix sv . For example, if a User
task needed to obtain the ID of the currently running thread, it would call gettid()
(get thread ID). This system call would proceed through the handler. The dispatcher
stages a call to sv gettid() which performs the privileged task.
In the dispatcher, after the corresponding sv function finishes executing, the
returned result is assigned to a local integer variable that is always returned. It should
be noted that the Embedded Xinu kernel defines system errors (SYSERR) to be signed
integers, thus the SVC dispatcher will return a signed result if the sv function yielded
an error. If a SYSERR is returned, then it must not be handled in the dispatcher.
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Rather, because the dispatcher is meant to execute calls as a middle entity, the value
must be preserved and returned to the caller.
Because simplicity is a design goal, it is important to use straightforward in-
structions where possible. In designing a mechanism to return values from the dis-
patcher to the calling API, many options are available. Unfortunately, because the
svc call(SVC NUM) function must be bound to an assembly instruction (svc #SVC NUM),
assignments cannot be made to directly get the result. Instead, one approach is for the
dispatcher to store the kernel function result into a global variable, and the API can
simply return the global variable. This design has the benefit of familiarity; a student
in a computer security course is likely experienced with using global variables to pro-
gram a feature across separate tasks. But because this work focuses on providing the
student with an extensive view of the hardware, it is desirable to use this component as
a lesson in consistency with a processor’s calling convention. The chosen approach is to
preserve the return value in r0 (in the handler), and use an “empty function” to make
the assignment in the corresponding API. This more closely follows the ARM calling
convention’s use of r0 as a result register. See Figure 4.5 for an example of a system
call API definition. The empty ARM routine, get result(), is simply defined as bx
lr. This function leaves r0 unchanged and allows a normal lefthand assignment of the
result.
uint getcpuid ( ) {
uint r e t v a l ;
s v c c a l l (SVC GETCPU) ; // svc
r e t v a l = ( u int ) g e t r e s u l t ( ) ; // get r0
re turn r e t v a l ;
}
Figure 4.5: Example of a system call API
4.0.4 Difficulties and Lessons Learned
4.0.5 Solving a Tricky Compiler Optimization Issue
Beginning this project, there was a large amount of confidence that the GNU
cross-compiler was minimally-configured. In adding major functionality to a an embed-
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ded operating system, it is important to square away all assumptions about how the
code will run. Failure to do so will surely result in lost time. Much of the initial stage
of development was directed at trying to understand a mysterious memory corruption
issue that was ultimately resolved by lowering a compiler optimization flag.
Switching out of System mode and into User mode for the first time, results
were intermittent. Performing system call tests such as getmode() seemed to nullify
memory space that had nothing to do with the system call (see Figure 4.6). The initial
assumption was that the SVC stack was growing the wrong direction into the BSS
segment’s space, stepping on global variables. After the issue seemed to disappear,
development continued far into the project. Unfortunately, the mysterious memory
corruption issue returned. By this time, there was an established set of assumptions in
the kernel based on the initial tests from when the issue went away, but all were offset
when the issue returned.
initialize.c (test):
usermode ( ) ;
u int ∗myptr ;
myptr = mal loc (4 ) ;
k p r i n t f ( ”My po in t e r i s : 0x%X\ r \n” , myptr ) ;
k p r i n t f ( ”My CPUID i s : %d\ r \n” , getcpuid ( ) ) ; // svc
kp r i n t f ( ”My po in t e r i s : 0x%X\ r \n” , myptr ) ;
Output:
My po in t e r i s : 0x835820
My CPUID i s : 0
My po in t e r i s : 0x0
Figure 4.6: Compiler optimizations modify a variable after svc
Examining the assembled .elf image using the ARM Library’s object-dump
binary utility, memory modifications were not immediately apparent. Luckily, the next
test that came to mind was to insert a compiler directive that disables optimizations.
When developing system call APIs, it was speculated that the established calling con-
vention might cause the compiler to decide that the order of execution between the
svc instruction and the following get result() does not matter. Thus, nopt was
defined (see Figure 4.7), turning optimization off for that function.
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#de f i n e nopt a t t r i b u t e ( ( opt imize ( ”0” ) ) )
Figure 4.7: Compiler optimization attribute
After placing nopt in the function definition that caused memory problems,
the memory issue was resolved. This begs the question, ”what is the relationship between
Supervisor calls and compiler optimization?” Examining the Makefile, an optimization
flag -Os was included. This flag performs many optimizations that shrink the kernel
size. Changing this flag back to the default, -O0 (Optimization level zero) [17], tells
the compiler to perform as little optimizations as possible, and the memory issue was
resolved. The former compiler optimization is beneficial to have in regular cases, but a
working kernel is better than a broken one that is slightly smaller.
4.0.6 Interrupts
On an embedded operating system that uses an on-board device such as a USB
(Universal Serial Bus) device, a mechanism must be in place to facilitate communication
between the O/S and the device. For many devices, an interrupt request line is the
necessary medium of communication. Upon initialization, the operating system will
enable a request line for each device it will interface with. Prior to this work, the
Xinu kernel enabled interrupts for many devices – most notably, the UART (Universal
Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter) and the USB. UART interrupts allow the receiver
to transfer data. This is useful in system functions that get input, such as getc().
However, without interrupts enabled, a User mode function is not able to get input.
As explained in 4.0.2, the critical initialization sequence can occur in System
mode. However, when the first context switch occurs from User mode, the msr (Move to
Status from Register) instruction, which updates the CPSR’s interrupt bits, is undefined.
This is unfortunate because without access to this instruction, the new thread cannot be
started with interrupts enabled. A circumvention of this issue was attempted by issuing
an svc instruction from the context switch routine. Subsequently, after changing the
SPSR in the SVC handler, interrupts were enabled. However, upon return from the
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svc, the system timer immediately interrupted the context switch code. In its current
state, the clock handler (called following a system timer interrupt) is unable to execute
in User mode. It was decided that, for the sake of time and simplicity, interrupts need
not be enabled to achieve what is intended.
4.0.7 Advanced Sample SVC Assignment
The sample assignment proposed in this section is a more advanced version of
the one described in Chapter 6. This assignment involves ARM programming and more
advanced C programming, allowing more creative freedom.
Students are given a kernel that boots into User mode, but does not yet initialize
the Supervisor mode stack in the bootloader. They are tasked with (1) setting up the
Supervisor mode stack and (2) implementing a system call for create(). This function
takes a variable amount of arguments (...), making both its API and dispatch cases
more challenging to write.
The amount of arguments that will be tested is unknown to the students, re-
quiring them to write an elegant C implementation to receive full credit. Written test
cases for this assignment might include readying created threads that perform an ar-
gument check. How students think about checking arguments can vary; for example, a
summation of a set of numbers would suffice as long as the expected result is returned.
Another type of test can be automated, checking arguments operationally.
Further tests can be conducted by calling create() multiple times, readying
the new thread each time. This type of stress test can determine whether the student’s
dispatch case properly accesses the variable arguments that were created. To make
the assignment even more difficult, a broken SVC handler could be provided such that
students need to push argument registers onto its stack and stage the call to the dispatch
function.
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4.0.8 Summary of Supervisor Calls
An educational operating system should be implemented on a hardware platform
that aligns with material for the course. The chosen platform defines the extent to which
hardware security protocols, such as system calls, can be implemented. Adding system
calls proved to be challenging, but a simple implementation was achieved, allowing
assignments to spawn from this work.
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CHAPTER 5
Memory Protection
This chapter describes the platform’s memory system and the changes required to
provide mode-based memory protection. This chapter ends with a detailed explanation
of an introductory sample assignment using this work.
5.0.1 Memory Management
5.0.2 Background
The Memory Managemeny Unit (MMU) is a functional unit that oversees the
processor’s use of available physical memory. Memory management units can be config-
ured to implement memory protection. A cache is an intermediary between the processor
and physical memory. For a unit that supports cacheing, regions marked as cacheable
are saved accordingly in a Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB). Figure 5.1 shows a
high-level MMU interface.
Figure 5.1: Generalized MMU interface
The arrows represent the flow of a memory request, from the processor (re-
quester) to the main memory, and back. The requested memory address is first exam-
ined by the MMU to ensure that it is valid. To accomplish this, the MMU examines
information stored in a hardware register that contains read and write permissions for a
given region. After determining that the address is accessible, an address translation is
performed. These translations are stored in the TLB, so the MMU simply references this
buffer and grabs the corresponding physical memory address. If a store was performed,
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then the memory system need not return a value. However, if a load operation was
performed, the request is updated to include the value located at the physical address,
and it sent back to the requester.
5.0.3 Enforcing Basic Protection
The Raspberry Pi 3 B+ supports two virtual memory system options: the MMU
and the Memory Protection Unit (MPU) [1]. The MPU provides a simpler interface
for programming regions, but because Embedded Xinu already enables the MMU, the
MMU was chosen for this implementation. This decision is better aligned with hardware
systems teaching; the MMU is a necessary computer component that students will be
familiar with, while the MPU is more of a specialty hardware unit offered by some
systems.
The Pi 3 B+ defines two levels of cache: L1 and L2. By default, L2 cache is dis-
abled on the Rapsberry Pi 3 B+ [1]. The most recent port of Embedded Xinu initializes
the MMU, but only uses the enabled L2 system for atomic operations, enforcing mutual
exclusion across cores [6]. Prior to this work, the enabled MMU did not make use of its
memory protection capabilities.
Figure 5.2: Pi 3 B+ memory hierarchy
Figure 5.2 shows the memory system implemented by this device. When the
MMU is initialized, the L2 cache is enabled and translations can begin. As described
earlier, a hardware register is required to determine access control. On this platform,
coprocessor register 15 (CP15) holds information about the memory region being ac-
cessed, such as whether it is cacheable, or whether the current execution mode is allowed
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to access it [1][21]. Following the address translation, the physical address may reside
in either of the two cache hierarchies, or in RAM.
This kernel configures the MMU in such a way that the translation between vir-
tual and physical translations is 1:1. This makes for a simpler design in which translated
memory addresses are visible to the requester. The platform’s memory architecture al-
lows memory regions to be programmed to one out of many various fixed sizes: 4KB
page, 64KB page, 1MB section, or 16MB supersection [1]. The latest kernel port uses
1MB sections, without subpages, for simplicity of design. 1MB sections allow for a con-
cise initialization of the MMU, making the code simpler for a student to understand.
This implementation keeps 1MB sections.
Figure 5.3: Simplified descriptor format for a 1MB section
MMU regions are defined by translation table descriptors. The chosen 1MB
section size uses a first-level descriptor format, as shown in Figure 5.3. When the C bit
is set, the 1MB region is cacheable. This detail is important when considering peripheral
address space; this region’s C bit must be disabled or profound effects may occur even
with basic output. 12 bits of the descriptor are reserved for the base address of the
section. The APX bit allows an extension of the normal access privilege (AP) bits.
Instead of four states for privileged and user access control permissions, when the APX
bit is set, two extra privilege states are made available, such as privileged read only. This
implementation does not set the APX bit, and makes use of either full access mode, or
user write disabled mode using AP bits, as shown in Section 5.0.4. The domain format
defines the access type over a collection of memory regions, allowing more flexibility in
advanced kernels. For simplicity, in this implementation, a single domain is defined for
the entire set of 1MB sections. The previous port of Embedded Xinu set the domain
bits to the Manager access type. This prevented accesses from being checked against the
access permission bits in the descriptor, thus a permission fault was never generated.
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Therefore, to enforce a level of memory protection, it is not only necessary to change
the AP bits, but also the domain bits. Changing these bits to Client Mode, accesses are
now checked against the AP bits in the entry.
Embedded Xinu’s MMU initialization code is written in C and ARM assembly.
The mmu init() C function oversees the general initialization of regions using a helper
function, mmu section(), to set appropriate descriptor format bits. A for loop cycles
through memory addresses, calling the helper. Once all of the section base addresses
have been mapped and the peripherals are marked as uncacheable, the MMU can be
started. ARM routine start mmu() performs necessary operations through CP15.
First, all instruction and data cache lines are invalidated. Before the domain and TLB
base is set, the TLB is invalidated to prevent invalid references leftover from a hardware
reset.
After a restricted access permission (i.e., User mode read-only) is applied to a
region and the MMU is enabled, Abort mode becomes a possible execution mode. As
introduced in section 4.0.2, Abort mode is an exception mode entered upon a memory
abort. Memory aborts are caused by invalid data memory accesses For example, if a
variable exists at memory address 0x00300, and this region is defined by the first-
level descriptor to be User mode read-only, then an attempt to change the value at
0x00300 from User mode would cause a data memory abort. The abort handler can be
programmed to deal with such a fault in a certain way. Depending on the handler’s
design, it might attempt the faulting instruction again after performing a dynamic
configuration. Otherwise, a simple abort handler will skip the faulting instruction.
5.0.4 Introductory Sample Assignment
This section presents a sample assignment using the changes described in this
chapter and in section 4.0.3. In this sample assignment, students are presented with a
main program that creates and runs two threads, in order. The first thread that runs sim-
ulates a normal thread, which makes a few system calls (e.g., gettid(), getcpuid())
and prints each result. The second thread simulates a malicious assignment of a global
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variable that causes the kernel to fault irrecoverably. The class is tasked with preventing
the fault from occurring, without removing or changing the rogue thread’s instructions.
void rogue thread ( void ) {
kp r i n t f ( ”Attempting to modify core zero ’ s r e a d y l i s t . . . \ r \n” ) ;
r e a d y l i s t [ 0 ] = −1;
kp r i n t f ( ” Ready l i s t mod i f i c a t i on attempt complete .\ r \n” ) ;
}
Figure 5.4: Example of a memory write to be protected
This sample assignment contains three major parts:
• Making the insert() function a system call,
• Modifying the access permission bits during the mmu init() routine, and
• Writing a simple Abort mode handler to skip the invalid instruction.
The global thread ready list is modified by insert(), which enqueues the ID
of the readied thread into the ready list. Assigning the list index to -1 will cause the
scheduler to malfunction, and a kernel error message is printed. Execution will not
continue after the error message is printed. Students can begin by thinking about the
protection provided by execution modes. If insert() is executed in Supervisor mode,
then the ready list will only ever be written from the privileged mode. Therefore, if
the address of the ready list is known, the MMU can be configured to only allow write
access to the address from a privileged mode.
This implementation uses a scheme to single out the ready list, placing it in a
known location away from kernel memory. First, to make the ready list address known,
a modification is required. In initialize.c, where the ready list queue is declared,
a compiler directive – together with a loader script modification – can be used to assign
the ready list to a known location (see Figure 5.5). Because the MMU uses 1MB sections
with 1:1 translations, the ready list can be defined at a high physical section such as
0x00800000.
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initialize.c:
q id typ r e a d y l i s t [NCORES] a t t r i b u t e ( ( s e c t i o n ( ” . readySect ion ” ) ) ) ;
loader script:
. readySegment 0x00800000 : {KEEP( ∗ ( . r eadySect ion ) ) }
Figure 5.5: Placing the ready list at a physical address using the loader script
With the ready list at a known location that is visible to students, they can be-
gin modifying mmu init() to use the USER READONLY access permission bits. Initially,
both AP bits are set, allowing full read and write access to both privileged and un-
privileged modes. The modification requires only the second AP bit to be set, granting
USER READONLY access for the region holding the ready list.
Once this is complete, the student will notice that the kernel hangs after at-
tempting to make the now-invalid assignment. This is not the desired behavior; the
description calls for the invalid instruction to be skipped. Some ARM assembly is re-
quired for the next part. The kernel is hanging because it is stuck in Abort mode,
due to the fault at the time of the attempted memory write. Students must modify the
abort handler to skip the faulted instruction. When the processor enters Abort mode
from a data fault, the link register is set to address of aborting instruction +
8 [1]. Therefore, to return to the instruction that follows the invalid assignment, the
abort handler would have to subtract 4 from the link register and branch to it.
5.0.5 Summary of Memory Protection
The MMU provides mode-based memory protection for its programmed regions.
This is done by configuring the access privilege bits during initialization of the MMU.
A sample assignment shows the practicality of mode-based hardware security. This
assignment gives the student a full view of what the MMU is doing and exemplifies an
important role of the hardware: to keep the kernel running when malicious instructions
enter the kernel.
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CHAPTER 6
Teaching With This Platform
This chapter details a version of the proposed system call assignment that was
run in a computer security course, including difficulties that students had with the
assignment.
6.0.1 Supervisor Call Assignment
In teams of two, computer security students worked to complete a 1-week assign-
ment that involved writing system call APIs. The course was comprised of 30 students:
12 took the course for graduate-level credit, and the other 18 were undergraduates. Dur-
ing the week of the assignment, lectures covered hardware-level security topics such as
common kernel protection techniques. While many of the students had programmed on
Embedded Xinu in a prior Marquette course, some students had not seen it before. This
assignment was written in such a way that it did not require much prior C experience
to solve it.
Leading up to the assignment, students had experience programming security
concepts in general-purpose languages. Before the system call assignment, their most
recent C assignment, a hands-on SEED Lab [33], applied theories in RSA encryption.
The system call assignment followed a buffer overflow project [38], implemented in Java.
6.0.2 Laboratory Environment
The Marquette University Systems Lab provides students with a set of Raspberry
Pi backend machines. After compiling their kernel, students upload their bootable image
to a Raspberry Pi by running a command from a Unix machine. An available backend
machine is selected from the pool, and the machine boots over TFTP, a network protocol
used to transfer files. Each Raspberry Pi is connected to a rebooter unit and a serial
port aggregator (see Figure 6.1).
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Figure 6.1: Marquette’s Systems Laboratory Environment
6.0.3 Implementation: System Call API
The students were given a document that introduced the assignment and de-
tailed their task of writing four system call APIs. The functions were getcpuid(),
gettid(), malloc(), and free(). The task sheet listed the files necessary to edit
and read (see Figure 6.2), explained the relationship between the files, and described
how to test their system calls.
Files to edit:
i n c lude / svc . h
svc / sv cde f s . c
system/ t e s t c a s e s . c
system/svc−d i spatch . c
Files to read:
svc /setmode . S
system/ g e t t i d . c
system/ getcpuid . S
system/svc−handler . S
mem/mal loc . c
mem/ f r e e . c
Figure 6.2: SVC assignment: given files to edit and read
Throughout the stripped-down kernel template that was provided, there was a
set of TODO statements explaining how files should be changed to support the system call
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API. For example, a sample block of code was provided for the getcpuid() interface,
similar to Figure 4.5 in Section 4.0.3, but the API is empty and ready for them to
implement.
6.0.4 Evaluation Questions
While evaluating code can help gauge a student’s understanding of the task
at hand, this is a less stable approach regarding a brand new assignment. There are
substantial uncertainties about the programs that will be produced. When creating
this assignment, it was unclear whether standalone evaluation of the code will be an
effective way to measure how well students understood system calls. Therefore, to
create a more pedagogically sound evaluation platform, the assignment description also
required students to answer five questions, as listed in Figure 6.3.
1 . What do you observe when a Superv i so r mode func t i on ( such as
sv ge t cpu id ( ) ) i s c a l l e d a f t e r the p ro c e s s o r en t e r s User mode?
Why?
2 . What do you observe when a User func t i on ( such as getcpuid ( ) )
i s c a l l e d be f o r e the p ro c e s s o r en t e r s User mode? Why?
3 . Explain what happens when you try to compi le your ke rne l in the
f o l l ow i n g s c ena r i o : A User func t i on ( such as getcpuid ( ) ) i s
c a l l e d a f t e r the p ro c e s s o r en t e r s User mode , but be f o r e you
created i t s API d e f i n i t i o n .
4 . On what core (0−3) i s the t e s t c a s e s ( ) thread running ?
5 . Using mal loc ( ) , a l l o c a t e 4 bytes o f memory once . What i s the
value o f the po inter , in hexadecimal , returned by mal loc ?
Figure 6.3: Evaluation questions for the system call assignment
These questions were meant to target different parts of the assignment. Some
questions have less to do with the API implementation and more to do with general
systems programming. Questions 1 and 2 test their understanding of their API imple-
mentation for the getcpuid() system call. sv getcpuid() invokes a coprocessor
register to return the value, thus this instruction is undefined in User mode, as Section
4.0.3 establishes. Question 3 tests their C knowledge; if they did not write a definition
for getcpuid(), the kernel will not compile. This question is also meant to better
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differentiate the similarly-named functions getcpuid() and sv getcpuid(). Ques-
tion 4 tests their implementation of the most basic system call, getcpuid(). It should
be noted that while Section 4.0.2 explains that a single core is used, it is not clear to
the student which core is being used – the code to initialize the core was included in
the given template as a pre-compiled, non-human-readable object file – not a C source
file. Question 5 tests their malloc() system call, which is perhaps the most difficult.
It must take an argument, stage the call after grabbing the argument from the stack
(performing appropriate casting), and return the result.
6.0.5 Difficulties
The most common issues from this assignment came from semantics of the system
call mechanism. For instance, some students asked about the SVC number definitions
in the header file, confused about how many SVC numbers were required. Of course,
a single SVC number is defined for a system call. Another question was asked about
the necessity of get result(), as it was presented as an “empty function” used for
assignments of the SVC dispatcher’s return value. The confusion stemmed from the
ARM calling convention’s use of r0 as the result register.
During the assignment, a compile error affected a handful of students. The
error, “cannot represent SWI relocation”, was especially confusing to students
because they were not sure what “SWI” meant; this assignment only uses the term
“SVC” to describe a software interrupt, to be consistent with the platform. This error
was caused by a typo in the usage of an SVC number definition.
Other questions were specific to the kernel. Some students had noticed that
gettid() returns a tid typ, while getcpuid() returns an unsigned integer. They
were wondering about the difference between the two types. tid typ is actually type-
def’d to int in Xinu’s stddef.h header file, which other students were able to find by
using Unix command line tools such as grep.
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6.0.6 Summary of Teaching With This Platform
A system call assignment was run in a computer security course. The assignment
was created with the intention of it not being too difficult while still presenting a new
challenge to the class. Along with programming, students were required to answer a se-
ries of evaluation questions to help quantify their knowledge of what they programmed.
The difficulties students experienced were typical for an embedded programming assign-
ment.
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CHAPTER 7
Outcomes
7.0.1 Written API Evaluation
To evaluate the written system call interfaces, a set of automatic grading scripts
(based upon the Xest tool [26]) provided nightly feedback to students as they built
them. At the deadline, final submissions were checked against the same set of nightly
test cases. This makes for simpler grading; if a student passed all test cases, then their
written solutions are guaranteed to function as expected. After examining the script-
generated result, the code was manually checked (by a human) to determine whether
the style of programming was adequate.
The programming portion was intended to be the most difficult part of the
assignment. However, students performed exceptionally well. Out of 30 students, 26
received full points. The few who did not receive full points came very close. While
it is difficult to predict performance when creating a new assignment, this result is not
completely unforeseen. This good performance can be attributed to the straightforward
nature of the programming required. Working closer to the hardware, students see how
elaborate details can affect the way they write programs. In this case, because each
system call interface is built almost the same way, if the student was able to solve one,
it seems the student had no difficulty writing the rest. Thus, most creative freedom in
this assignment is traded off for exposure of the realities of embedded programming.
7.0.2 Analyzing Responses to Evaluation Questions
While examining code can be a reliable way of measuring performance, a more
accurate picture can be painted by examining responses to the proposed evaluation
questions. This work is about providing students with a deeper understanding of the
hardware, but it is worthwhile to examine the possible advantages that students may
have held over others.
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Figure 7.1: Evaluation question performance by prior Xinu experience
The significant advantage in this assignment comes with a student’s prior famil-
iarity with Embedded Xinu. Whether Xinu was taught at a high level or the student
actually spent time programming Xinu (in operating systems, for example), this qualifies
as prior Xinu experience. Figure 7.1 shows the number of questions answered correctly
by students (zero being no submission, five being a perfect score), split by prior Xinu
exposure.
7.0.3 Discussion of Results
The only students who answered every evaluation question correctly had prior
experience with Xinu. However, those who have never seen Xinu before also exhibited
a good understanding of the concepts. The most common evaluation question answered
incorrectly was question 2. Some students did not describe the correct behavior. Others
described correctly that the User mode function can execute in System mode, but did
not have the proper reasoning. System mode has full privilege over the instruction set,
therefore it must be allowed to execute the task that we call a ”User mode function”.
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In theory, a preliminary survey could have been conducted asking whether the
student has had prior Xinu experience. But to increase the difficulty of the assignment
based on its responses would be unfair to those who have never seen Xinu before.
7.0.4 Summary of Outcomes
After evaluating performance on the system call assignment, students programmed
solutions that received full credit, for the most part. The responses to the evaluation
questions yielded more interesting results, showing that students who answered all ques-
tions correctly had prior familiarity with Xinu. However, students without prior Xinu
experience also performed well. While the assignment did not prioritize creative free-
dom, it did provide students with a hands-on learning experience about hardware-level
security.
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CHAPTER 8
Summary and Future Work
8.0.1 Summary
Common approaches in teaching computer security are impractical, or are too
complicated to be effective. An embedded platform can offer hardware units that provide
a valuable, hands-on learning experience. Recent work has shown a growing interest in
using educational operating systems to teach computer security. Few of these systems
are taught on a real hardware platform.
This work introduced system calls, a major structural change to the Embed-
ded Xinu operating system. An implementation of mode-based memory protection was
also provided. Sample assignments proposed ways that this work can be used in prac-
tice. A system call assignment was run in a computer security course, and promising
data showed that this work can be used as a foundation for learning elaborate security
concepts.
8.0.2 Future Work
Because this work involved adding new hardware-related features to the kernel,
plenty of directions of future work involve higher-level expansions. In the future, nested
SVC calls can be researched. It is unclear whether they are supported on this platform,
but the ability to nest an svc instruction would simplify the Xinu kernel, especially if
a separate user and kernel space is desired.
Another point of future work is to narrow down the tricky GCC optimization
included by the -Os flag. If the specific optimization is disabled, then the kernel size
can still be reduced by the other optimizations enabled by the flag.
A significant direction of future work is a full integration of system calls and
memory protection into the kernel, paving the way to a full release. The MIPS port
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of Embedded Xinu defined a platform-specific scheme of memory protection. Perhaps
much of its code can be modified to support this platform’s use of the MMU for memory
protection. Further, a full integration implies that the main thread should be protected
from the kernel space. With that, interrupts should be enabled to provide basic interfac-
ing with the shell and other devices. The Ethernet driver should also function properly
from User mode. Finally, the other three cores would have to be enabled, but this could
be simpler than it sounds, especially if the integration is tested on a single core first.
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